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Introduction
People feel less happy when the situation in which they find themselves compares unfavorably with that of others. The relevance of such social comparisons for subjective well-being in the realm of incomes was first noticed by Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 . Easterlin appealed to concepts of social comparison and adaptation to income to explain why average happiness in developed countries does not significantly rise over time as these countries become richer, whereas within a country richer people tend to be significantly happier than poorer people (the Easterlin paradox). Social comparison implies that the utility of individuals does not so much depend on the absolute level of their income but, rather, on the level of their income relative to that of others in their social reference group. A substantial theoretical and empirical literature has investigated the relevance and implications of social income comparisons for subjective well-being. Recent empirical studies generally found that there exists a systematic relative income effect on well-being (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-iCarbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Clark et al., 2008b; Layard et al., 2009; Clark and Senik, 2010) . However, with the exception of a few experimental studies that controlled the reference group (see Carter and McBride, 2009; Card et al., 2010) , most empirical studies assumed reference groups that were only proxies of the actual, unobserved reference groups, leading to problems of measurement error and endogenous variation in the income of the relevant reference groups.
This study examines the extent to which social comparisons between colleagues drive the effects of a drastic change in the retirement system for the Dutch public sector on the job satisfaction of older workers. By exploiting the shock in the retirement system, we avoid the problems of potential spurious correlations and measurement error that may have biased the results in previous retirement and social comparison studies. More specifically, in 2006, the Dutch public sector was subject to a major pension reform that treated two very similar groups of employees differently. Prior to 2006, public sector workers in the Netherlands could retire at age 62 years and three months with a mean replacement rate of 70% of their average yearly earnings since 2004. As of 2006, those born before January 1, 1950, could continue to retire under the old rules, but for those born on or after January 1, 1950, the mean replacement rate was lowered to 64%. These younger workers now need to work an additional one year and one month to obtain the 70% replacement rate enjoyed by counterparts who may be just a few days, weeks, or months older.
We match panel survey data that contain various indicators of well-being with administrative data from the public sector's pension fund and estimate, two and three years after the shock in the pension system, the individual well-being of male workers born in 1949 and 1950. We find strong and persistent effects of the drop in pension rights on the job satisfaction of treated as well as untreated 2 workers. The impact of the shock on the job satisfaction of treated workers is equivalent to having an annual wage that is about sixty percent lower. Both the size and persistence of this impact can be fully explained as being the result of social comparisons with colleagues who are not affected by the reform as well as with those affected. We find that treated workers suffer more from the reform when they have more untreated colleagues in their organization and income group, while they suffer less when they have more treated colleagues. As can be expected, we find that the social comparison effect is more significant for those who work in sectors that stimulate team work, and less significant for workers who have alternative sources of pension income or a partner who will receive an own pension income after retirement. We also find evidence that treated workers compare their own replacement rate with the average replacement of comparable colleagues in their organization. Our results, however, strongly suggest that the major part of the social comparison effect is non-monetary. This can be attributed to feelings of being unfairly treated among those affected by the reform.
Moreover, our estimates indicate a negative external effect of the percentage of treated employees on the job satisfaction of each worker in the organization. This is the opposite of what social comparisons would imply and may hint at a negative effect of treated frustrated employees on the general atmosphere in the organization (Williamson, 1973; Zárraga and Bonache, 2005) . Finally, we also find treatment, social comparison and atmosphere effects on other dimensions of life satisfaction than job satisfaction, namely on satisfaction with health, hours worked and leisure.
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, our main contribution is to the social comparison literature that, in general, has difficulties to isolate exogenous variation in the income of relevant peer groups (Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; Clark., 2003 , Bender, 2004 Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Clark et al., 2008b Layard et al., 2009 ). Our paper is closest related to the study of Card et al. (2010) in which randomized manipulation of access to information on colleagues' wages is used to identify the effects of relative income on individual job satisfaction. They found that the information treatment asymmetrically affects workers' job satisfaction: workers with a salary below the median report a lower job satisfaction, while the satisfaction level of those with an income above the median did not change. Similarly to Card et al. (2010) , we analyze social comparisons between colleagues, since, regarding the direction of comparisons, colleagues are generally the most frequently cited reference group (Clark and Senik, 2010) . However, instead of using exogenous manipulation of information on differences in salaries, the main advantage of our research design is that the shock in the pension system exogenously generates variation in the average income in a reference group of workers as it affects only a specific subgroup of workers. The limited age difference between the treatment and control groups in our sample and the simple and transparent birth-year criterion determining 3 entitlement to the old or new pension rights further guarantee the internal validity of our regression discontinuity design.
Second, we also contribute to the literature that has empirically analyzed the relation between retirement and well-being by shedding more light on the causal effects of an exogenous change in retirement expectations on job satisfaction, and by showing the effects of social comparison between workers with different pension rights on various domains of life satisfaction. Recent studies used panel data analysis to trace the effects of retirement transitions on well-being over time (e.g., Kim and Moen, 2002; Dave et al., 2006; Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 2006) . However, these panel studies could not fully account for spurious correlations and reverse causality between retirement and well-being over time (e.g., due to negative health shocks). An exception is the study of Charles (2004) , who controlled for this by instrumenting retirement on the basis of discontinuous age-specific retirement incentives in the US social security system and changes in laws affecting mandatory retirement and social security benefits. The author found compelling evidence that retirement has a positive causal effect on mental well-being after ascertaining that retirement and well-being are simultaneously determined while failing to control for reverse causality would lead to the false conclusion that retirement has a negative effect on well-being. Our findings of strong effects of changing retirement expectations on well-being are consistent with the Charles finding. 1 Third, our study does not focus on the actual transition into retirement, as most retirement studies have, but it shows that having to adjust expectations about retirement due to an exogenous shock in the pension system has strongly negative effects on workers' individual well-being. 2 The shock substantially compromises job satisfaction, with the potential result of decreasing effort provision and individual productivity among treated workers.
3 Our results are consistent with those of Falba et al. (2008) , who examined the impact on mental well-being of deviations of actual retirement dates from preceding expectations and found that mental well-being is negatively affected for those working longer than expected, as well as for those working less long than expected (see NuttmannSchwartz (2004) , Bossé et al. (1987), and Dreyer (1989) for related studies). However, unlike Falba et 1 Our study is also related to studies on the effects of other bad life shocks. Among others, Clark and Oswald (1994) , Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), and Clark et al. (2008a) have shown that unemployment and layoffs significantly reduce well-being, with significant lag and lead effects. Other studies have focused on the relation between disability shocks and well-being (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008) , environmental shocks (Luechinger, 2009) , divorce effects (Lucas, 2005; Gardner and Oswald, 2006) , and the effects of winning the lottery (Gardner and Oswald, 2007) .
2 This is also shown in De for the case of depression. However, that study does not focus on social comparison effects. Our study is also related to the literature on external effects in organizations since our estimates indicate a negative external effect of the percentage of treated employees on the job satisfaction of each worker in the organization.
3 See Montizaan et al. (2012) for the important role of reciprocity in this.
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al. (2008), who analyzed the effects of deviations from retirement expectations on a one-sided measure of well-being (depression) 4 , this study uses answers to self-assessed questions on job satisfaction and other dimensions of life satisfaction, and documents strong and persistent social comparison and external effects on individual well-being. Since the impact of policies on the wellbeing or welfare of citizens is an essential concern of economic policy per se and job satisfaction is an important determinant of workplace performance and individual productivity (Jones et al., 2008) , these social comparison effects should be taken into account when modeling the effects of a drop in the generosity of pensions on productive labor supply.
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This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief description of the institutional setting of the pension system in the Netherlands and the policy change that was implemented in January 2006. Section 3 describes the data and examines the validity of our natural experiment. The econometric model that we use is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main estimation results and Section 6 gives a robustness analysis for heterogeneous subsamples. We close with a discussion of our conclusions.
The shock in the Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars: The two main pillars consist of a flat-rate public scheme to which all residents are entitled at the age of 65 and earnings-related sectoral pensions of the defined-benefit type that enable most employees in the Netherlands to retire early, before the age of 65. The third pillar includes all voluntarily built-up savings supplementary to the occupational pensions and public scheme, typically taken as annuities through an insurance company. However, due to the well-established sectoral pensions in the second pillar, the third pillar is less well developed in the Netherlands.
For individual employees, participation in the sectoral pension schemes is generally mandatory, which ensures that more than 95% percent of the employed population is covered and 4 Similarly, Charles (2004) and De Grip et al. (2012) used the one-sided measures of depression and loneliness. 5 In the past two decades, policy makers in most industrialized countries have developed new incentives to increase the labor force participation of older workers to counter the negative effects of demographic change on the labor supply and sustainability of extant retirement systems. The literature on retirement has shown that reducing the generosity of pensions or increasing the eligibility age for retirement may be an effective policy measure to delay retirement and to reduce the fall in the future labor supply (Kapteyn, 1998; Börsch-Supan, 2000; Gruber and Wise, 2004; Coile and Gruber, 2007; Coile and Levine, 2007) . However, most studies on retirement build implicitly on the assumption that the individual well-being and effort provision of workers who face a cut in the generosity of their pension are not affected by the shock in the pension system. 5 therefore eligible for early-retirement pensions. These pension schemes are predominantly fully funded and are negotiated between unions and employer organizations at the sector or firm level and are officially set forth in collective agreements. In accordance with the Pensions and Savings Act (Pensioen en Spaarfondsenwet), the administration of the occupational pension schemes is delegated to pension funds to which both employers and employees contribute. The Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds (ABP) is the pension fund for public sector workers in the Netherlands. Until 2006, sectoral pension schemes were facilitated by the government through preferential tax treatment that allowed employees and employers to deduct their contributions to the sectoral early-retirement schemes from their pre-tax income. This tax exemption granted large tax advantages due to the progressive tax system (Euwals et al., 2006) .
A reform of the Dutch pension system conducted in 2006 provides the basis for our natural experiment. To stimulate the labor force participation of older workers, the government abolished the favorable tax treatment of early sectoral retirement schemes in the second pillar for all workers born after 1949. 6 In the summer of 2005, anticipation of the change in tax rules led to a new collective bargaining process on the introduction of a new pension scheme for the public sector (the ABP flexible pension scheme). Given the high number of older workers in the public sector, it had by then been acknowledged that reforms of the pension system would be a necessity. Therefore, a change in pension rights was not entirely unexpected. However, the timing of the reform as well as the particular implementation of a discontinuous assignment rule that contained a strongly differential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950, came as a surprise when it was announced on July drop in pension benefits, (ii) an increase in pension contribution payments to partly account for the drop in pension wealth resulting from (i), and (iii) stronger incentives to continue working, generated by penalties on pension income when retiring before commencement of the state pension at age 65
and by supplements for later retirement. Moreover, the eligibility age for pension benefits is increased to 60 years and workers can decide to continue working until their 70th birthday. Note that the supplements to the pension benefits for later retirement ensure that workers who already before the shock in the pension system planned to continue working until they are 65 do not experience a drop in pension wealth. 8 However, together with the penalties on pension income before the retirement age of 65, the increase in the eligibility age implies that workers' options to retire early were always reduced.
For younger workers, the increase in pension contributions partly compensates for the decrease in pension benefits over time. However, public sector workers born just after 1949 do not have enough time to fully compensate for this drop in pension benefits. Therefore, as a consequence of both the abolition of the tax rules and the steeper early retirement scheme, workers born shortly after December 31, 1949, are confronted with a substantial decrease in pension benefits if they wish to retire at age 62 and three months. More specifically, the average replacement rate at that age has dropped to 64% and they must work an additional 13 months to qualify for a pension at a replacement rate of 70%.
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Public sector workers can react in three possible ways to the shock in the pension system: (i) They can postpone retirement to reduce the gap in their pension wealth when retiring early;
(ii) they can decide to retire at the initially planned date against a lower replacement rate, in which case they have to accept that their lifetime pension income is lower due to the lower replacement rate;
or (iii) they can increase their individual private (pension) savings. A relevant saving mechanism is the Life-Course Savings program (Levensloopregeling), which was introduced by the Dutch government in 2006. This program allows tax-free savings of up to 12% of annual earnings in a fund that can be used to finance periods of non-employment, such as a sabbatical or early retirement.
Workers are allowed to save up to 210% of their annual earnings in this Life-Course Savings fund, which can be used to finance about two years of early retirement. Special arrangements were made for older workers who were most affected by the pension reform. Those who were born in the years 1950 8 The proportion of workers who planned to retire at the age of 65 before the shock in the pension system is extremely small. 
Data and descriptives
Data collection
We use unique panel survey data that are matched to administrative data for male full-time public sector workers born in 1949 or 1950. 10 The administrative data come from the Dutch pension fund for public sector employees (ABP). The data contain detailed information on the number of years worked and contributed to the public sector's pension fund, annual wages, tenure in the public sector, number of working hours, and employer organization.
The survey data are available for three years. The data in the initial wave were collected in two stages one year after the introduction of the new pension system. In the first stage, all 27,871 male public sector employees born in 1949 or 1950 were sent a request to participate in the study and to give their e-mail address. In the second stage, in March 2007, the 11,458 employees who gave their permission were sent an e-mail with a link to the survey. 11 To avoid biases such as mis-measurement due to possibly highly inflated answers when surveys do not ask the respondents to answer the questions truthfully (see Harrison and List, 2004 , for a discussion on this topic) or affected answers since the respondents were aware of the survey's experimental objectives, the invitation letter and the e-mail with the link to the survey bore great similarities to the cover letter advocated by Dillman (1978) . The letter and the e-mail conveyed general information about the social usefulness of the study without revealing the survey's experimental character. They also explicitly ensured confidentiality such that the respondents need not fear repercussions from responding in a socially undesired manner. Furthermore, references to the natural experimental character of the research 10 We focus on male employees, since in the Netherlands male employees aged 56 or 57 years are usually the main wage earners, while female workers in the same birth cohort predominantly have disrupted careers. In this age range, on average, men have contributed for 28 years to the pension fund, whereas women have contributed on average for only 16 years.
Moreover, only a small, select group of these women is still working. In the public sector, only 30% of all employees born between 1940 and 1950 are women, and 72% of these work in a flexible or part-time job (Statistics Netherlands, 2009 
1) How satisfied are you with your job?
Furthermore, we asked questions on life satisfaction and its underlying domains, which gives us the advantage of observing how the shock in the pension system affects different aspects of life satisfaction: Previous studies have shown that the reliability of these subjective well-being measures is sufficiently high to support much of the research that is currently undertaken on subjective well-being, particularly in studies where group means are compared, that is, across activities or demographic
groups. Yet, the reliability of these measures is lower than that typically found for education, income, and many other microeconomic variables, due to their discreteness and non-random measurement errors (Frey and Stutzer, 2002a,b; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Luttmer, 2005; Krueger and Schkade, 2008 ).
14 To avoid framing effects, we made sure that the well-being questions were not placed directly after questions on pension rights, but were placed after a block of questions on education and training courses.
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In addition to the questions on well-being, we gathered detailed information on retirement expectations to assess whether public sector employees are indeed aware of the shock in their pension rights and whether their retirement expectations in general are reliable. Questions were asked on when respondents expected to retire and how high their pension benefits would be as a percentage of their net wage income if they retired at the age of 62, 63, or 65. Lastly, we asked questions in the 2009
wave on the partners of the male public sector employees in our sample. with the effects of income changes on job satisfaction, it will turn out that the effect is sizable.
Descriptives
Furthermore, Figure 1 also shows a clear discontinuity in the job satisfaction of those born in 1949 as compared to 1950. Hence, these exploratory analyses already provide some preliminary evidence of a treatment effect.
When we look at our measures for life satisfaction and the other dimensions of life satisfaction, we observe from Table 1 that almost all scores are lower for those born in 1950. More specifically, the t-tests, based on this rough comparison, show that there are significant differences between the control and treatment groups in life satisfaction and in satisfaction with hours worked and leisure time.
These differences in average satisfaction between the treatment and control groups are the result of differences in the underlying distributions of the individual satisfaction scores toward lower 
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Next, we verify whether the employees in our sample are aware of the exogenous shock in their pension rights and that the observed difference in the well-being indicators is not due to some artifact in the data. The answers to the questions on retirement expectations can help us to deal with this matter. The summary statistics in Table 1 show that respondents who are affected by the pension reform indeed expect a significantly lower replacement rate if they retire at the age of 62. The mean difference in the expected retirement benefits between the treatment and control groups is 5.1
percentage points, which is remarkably close to the actual mean difference between these groups.
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Moreover, Table 1 shows that both groups expect a higher replacement rate if they retire later and that the difference in the expected replacement rates at the age of 65 between both groups is extremely small. This finding is consistent with the new pension system due to its specific penalty structure, which enables workers born in 1950 to retire at the age of 65 without a drop in their pension wealth.
Given the fact that, on average, workers can assess their replacement rate at the age of 62 rather well and that their answers show some knowledge of the penalties and supplements provided by the new pension system, it is reasonable to conclude that employees are, on average, aware of the consequences of the new pension system. 17 Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the decrease in pension rights due to the pension system reform has increased the expected retirement age. Employees born in 1949 expect, on average, to retire three months later than those born in 1950.
Finally, we check whether individuals in the treatment and control groups have, apart from the differences in their pension rights, similar characteristics. Table 1 16 Note also that the expected replacement rates for both groups dropped considerably in 2009. This can be explained by the financial crisis causing a dramatic fall in the reserves of the public sector pension fund. The fall in reserves induced the pension fund to (temporarily) stop applying indexation, that is, adjusting pensions to the inflation rate or the wage trend.
17 Figure 2 shows the expected replacement rates at the age of 62 for workers born in 1949 and 1950. The figure shows that there is a clear break in expectations around the threshold date (December 31, 1949) .
ensure the validity of the natural experiment. Job characteristics and personal characteristics are similar across both groups and, with a few exceptions, not significantly different from each other.
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The differences in the yearly wages and number of years contributed to the pension fund are due to the small age difference between the control and treatment groups. The difference in life-course savings investments is a logical consequence of the pension reform; that is, those with reduced pension rights increase their private savings to (partly) compensate for their lost pension wealth. The fraction of married individuals is slightly higher among the group that is not affected by the reform.
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It will therefore be important to control for marital status in our analyses.
Econometric model
People tend to compare themselves with others. This is a deeply ingrained human inclination that is likely to play an important role in the present context as well (see Frey and Stutzer (2002b) 
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In our main analyses, we make use of a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effects of the shocks in pension rights on job satisfaction (Van der Klaauw, 2002). More specifically, for the measurement of the effects of the individual treatment as well as the average treatment in the social reference group, we estimate a regression discontinuity model with random effects of the form
Here JS Table 2 gives information on the average number of treated and untreated workers by organization and income tertile. to stress that organizations in the public sector (2,342 organizations in total) are relatively large compared to those in the private sector. Organizations have on average 5,436 employees (median size is 1,146). In the following, we will often, for the sake of brevity, drop the adverb "barely" when referring to barely treated and barely untreated workers.
above-median earners, we expect the social comparison effect on the untreated employees to be insignificantly different from zero (
). In that case, the social comparison effect on the treated employees is given by 3 β , which we expect to be positive (
), because we anticipate that treated workers will feel less frustrated when several colleagues in the same income group suffer from the treatment as well (shared misery).
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The next four terms including the running birth date variable B i control for confounding effects of potential age trends or shifts in age trends due to the shock in the pension system on the main and interaction effect of the treatment (as required in a sharp regression discontinuity design). It is well-known that well-being is a function of age. Several cross-sectional studies have found that well-being may increase with age (Campbell et al., 1976; Prenda and Lachman, 2001) , while other studies have found that this relationship is U-shaped (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008) . This empirical evidence suggests that it is relevant to control for these potential age trends and to investigate whether potential differences in job satisfaction or in social comparison effects on job satisfaction between the two birth cohorts go beyond what would be expected based on the treatment effect alone. Finally, we include a set of control variables X it to account for differences between the treatment and control groups further away from the threshold of January 1, 1950. This set includes yearly wage (in logs), marital status, years contributed to the pension fund, contractual working hours, number of doctor visits, year of measurement, educational level, and sub-sector fixed effects.
The choice for using a random effects model is motivated by the need to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 23 We can safely assume that the coefficient of the treatment dummy is not biased by unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as differences in individual scales of job satisfaction, because of this study's experimental setup. After all, assignment to the treatment or control group is exogenous and as good as random just near the threshold, rendering the coefficient of 22 The implied asymmetry in social comparison between treated and untreated workers is analogous to the asymmetry in income comparisons that was already postulated by Duesenberry (1949) , and that has empirically been confirmed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) , Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) , and Card et al. (2010) . Vendrik and Woltjer interpret the asymmetry as a kind of loss aversion in the context of prospect theory, while Card et al. relate it to the inequity-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
the treatment dummy unbiased. However, this does not hold for relevant control variables such as the yearly wage, marital status and the number of years contributed to the pension fund. Although we are primarily interested in the coefficient of the treatment variable, it is relevant for our understanding of the treatment effect to compare its size more closely to unbiased correlations for these other variables.
Furthermore, the random effects model treats job satisfaction as a cardinal construct. There are two reasons why we use this type of model: (i) Panel estimation uses the whole sample rather than a reduced sample in models that deal explicitly with the ordinal character of the dependent variable.
(ii)
The results of cardinal models are more intuitive and easier to interpret. In addition, cardinal and ordinal analyses of life satisfaction yield, in general, similar results (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004) . However, consistent with the existing literature, we find that the estimates of ordered probit models including random effects do not differ much from those in our main analyses (see Table A .1 in Appendix A.1). Table 3 shows the results of regression discontinuity model (1) for the effects of the pension reform on job satisfaction. Column 1 of Table 3 contains the results of a baseline specification, where, apart from the indicator for the reform and the controls for the running birth date variable and year of measurement, no other variables are included. Column 2 of Table 2 includes the other control variables and Column 3 adds the effects of the average treatment in the social reference group and the corresponding control variables for birth date effects.
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Main results
Social comparison effects
The results of the specifications presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show that the reform has a significantly negative effect on job satisfaction and that the magnitude of this effect hardly have a negative effect on the general atmosphere in the organization (Williamson, 1973; Záragga and Bonache, 2005) . 27 However, for treated workers this negative atmosphere effect is more than 26 Interestingly, this is analogous to the mitigating effects of higher reference group unemployment (at the regional, partner, or household level) on the loss of well-being of British and German unemployed people (Clark, 2003; .
Note that this effect cannot be distinguished from the complementary possibility that treated employees do not feel as bad when fewer colleagues within the same income tertile are untreated. 27 We also performed control analysis in which we controlled for the size and a proxy for the age structure of the organization. Table A .3 of Appendix A.1 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of these organization characteristics. This implies that the atmosphere effect is unlikely to pick up a potential negative effect of a higher percentage of relatively younger workers in the organization on the job satisfaction of older workers. The atmosphere effect is comparable to the negative effect of regional unemployment on the life satisfaction of employed and unemployed men with good job prospects, as found by . It might also reflect feelings of empathy or inequality aversion of untreated colleagues towards their less lucky treated colleagues. 28 The mean of the fraction treated by organization and income tertile is 0.522. 29 We also performed placebo analyses in which we estimated Equation 1 for life satisfaction and its underlying domain satisfactions other than job satisfaction (Table A .4 in Appendix A.1.) These analyses buttress our findings by showing that the social comparison effects are significant and large for satisfaction with the number of hours worked and the amount of leisure time. As the pension reform implies that many workers have to work longer, it is highly conceivable that especially these leisure-related domains of satisfaction are affected. Moreover, the significant social comparison effect on health satisfaction is in line with the results of De Grip (2012), who found that mental health of treated workers declined. Finally, we find no significant social comparison effect for domains of life satisfaction that should not directly be affected by the pension reform (satisfaction with present household income and wage).
A remarkable implication of these results is that the pension reform not only has a strong negative effect on the job satisfaction of the treated workers, but also indirectly via a less congenial atmosphere has a sizable negative effect on the job satisfaction of the untreated workers. To obtain a better idea of the sizes of both impacts, it is instructive to compare them with the coefficient of the log wage. Although the latter should only be interpreted as a correlation since there may be spurious correlations and reverse causality between wage and job satisfaction, resulting in potential, probably upward, biases in the coefficient of the log wage, the comparison nevertheless suggests that the impacts of the reform are sizable. If we assume that causality runs from log wage to job satisfaction, the impact of the reform on the treated workers is equivalent to having an annual wage that is about 60% lower while the impact of the reform on the untreated workers corresponds to a fall in the wage by more than 40%. 
Absolute and relative treatment effects and adaptation
From the previous results, it is striking that the social comparison effect on the job satisfaction of treated workers is larger in size than the main treatment effect. In the following this will be shown to imply that the latter treatment effect can be fully explained as being the result of social comparison with colleagues. To see this we rewrite equation (1) Table 4 shows that this absolute treatment effect (0.186) is insignificant while the relative treatment effect (-0.769) is statistically significant at the 5%-level. The overall main treatment effect on job satisfaction as presented in Column 1 of Table 4 31 (-0.583) is thus revealed to have only a significant relative component, and hence seems to be entirely 30 For the treated workers the equivalent decrease in Δlnw equals -0.486/0.548 = -0.887, implying a fall in w by a factor exp(-0.887) = 0.412, and hence a fall by (1-0.412)x100 = 58.8%. For the untreated workers the equivalent decrease in Δlnw is -0.305/0.548 = -0.557, implying a fall by 42.7%. Put somewhat differently, as a decrease of one standard deviation in the log wage is 0.325, the impact of the reform on the job satisfaction of the treated workers is equivalent to that of a decrease of 0.887/0.325 = 2.7 standard deviation in the log wage. As the wage coefficient may be upwardly biased, these estimates of the sizes of the impacts of the pension reform in terms of falls in the wage seem to represent lower bounds, and hence suggest that the effects are large. 31 This column is a reproduction of Column 3 of Table 3 .
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caused by social comparison with colleagues. In addition, there is a negative atmosphere effect of the average treatment in the organization on treated and untreated employees alike.
An interesting general feature of happiness effects of changes in living conditions is that they often tend to erode over time as a result of hedonic adaptation (e.g., Clark et al., 2008a; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008) . In particular, it has been found that people recover after sudden shocks in their income , although often they only adapt partially (Van Landeghem, 2010; Mentesoglu and Vendrik, 2011) . It is conceivable that the treated workers in our sample also become accustomed over time to the fact that they have reduced pension rights and accordingly adapt their assessment of their well-being. Although such a reduction of pension rights implies changes in expectations about future retirement conditions rather than instantaneous changes in living conditions, the psychological literature on happiness (Wilson et al., 2003) suggests that people adapt their happiness not only to changes in their living conditions after these have taken place, but also, in general, to any emotional event, and hence also to changes in their expectations about future conditions before these take place. The crucial factor that triggers such hedonic adaptation is that the changes have become definite and certain. A large part of the adaptation then tends to take place within two or three years (Clark et al., 2008a; . However, recent studies on relative concerns in happiness (Di Tella and McCulloch, 2010:
Mentesoglu and Vendrik, 2011) strongly suggest that people do not adapt or adapt much less to changes in their relative position than they do to absolute alterations in their living conditions.
Because the main treatment effect that we find is entirely relative, we may expect that this effect has not much changed between 2008 and 2009. This can be tested by adding to equation (1) interaction terms of the treatment dummy and the birth date controls with the year of measurement.
We would then expect a significant positive coefficient of the interaction term of the treatment dummy. In addition, we can investigate the persistence of the atmosphere effect and the social 
Monetary and non-monetary components
Since relative deprivation effects on job satisfaction have been found in the happiness literature to be both larger and more persistent over time than the absolute effects of worsening conditions, our finding that the main treatment effect is entirely relative partly explains why it is remarkably strong as well as stable between 2008 and 2009. However, why the effects of the pension reform are so much larger than the wage effect, as shown in Section 5.1, remains a puzzle since wage effects across individuals are mainly relative as well. This suggests that the effects of the reform may contain important non-monetary components in addition to the direct monetary effects due to the fall in the average expected replacement rate at age 62 from 70% to 64%. For the treated workers such a nonmonetary effect could originate from feelings of being treated differently -and in this case unfairlyfrom colleagues slightly older and born in 1949.
33
We test for the existence of non-monetary effects of the pension reform by adding as control variables to equation (2) and a relative component, but that the respondents quickly became accustomed to the absolute component (as found for absolute income by Mentesoglu and Vendrik, 2011) . Since we measure the main treatment effect two and three years after the reform, it could well be that the adaptation process of the absolute component had already taken place.
33 Such a non-monetary effect would not arise from the rise in the average expected retirement age by three months of those born in 1950 since that represents an endogenous, behavioral, and assumedly utility-raising response to alleviate the negative effects of the lower replacement rate. 
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The resulting coefficient estimates are shown in Column 1 of Table 5 . As expected, the absolute effect of the individual replacement rate is small and statistically insignificant. The effect of the average replacement rate is small and statistically insignificant as well, indicating that there is no monetary component of the atmosphere effect. On the other hand, the coefficient of the individual replacement rate relative to the average replacement for the treated workers (0.812) is large and (weakly) statistically significant. Thus, the relative treatment effect has a strong monetary component, which indicates that treated workers feel frustrated by the relatively higher replacement rate of their untreated colleagues. Moreover, it follows that the overall monetary treatment effect on job satisfaction due to the fall in the expected replacement rate at age 62 seems entirely relative. We can also approximately assess the relative sizes of the non-monetary and monetary components of the effects of the pension reform. Appendix A2 shows that, for the estimates in Column (4) of Table 5 , the total non-monetary effect of the pension reform on the job satisfaction of 34 The coefficients of the individual and average replacement rates also pick up the effects of cross-sectional variation in replacement rates between different individuals when adaptation has worked out. In our case, it is likely that adaptation to the pension reform has likely worked out as well at the times of the survey (see the end of the previous section). Therefore, there is no clear reason why the former cross-sectional effects should bias the coefficients for the monetary effects of the pension reform. On the other hand, the coefficient of the individual replacement rate may be biased due to a spurious correlation via personality characteristics or reverse causality. Therefore, we have also estimated equation (3) controlling for Mundlak terms for the replacement rates (and the other control variables). Furthermore, measurement error in the individual replacement rate does not seem important as job satisfaction can be assumed to be affected by the subjective expectation about the individual replacement rate at age 62 as expressed in the questionnaire rather than by the true value of this replacement rate. 35 In theory, the non-monetary treatment effect may also pick up the effect of the increase in pension contribution payments which was part of the pension reform (see Section 2). However, this increase was small and may barely have been noticed by those affected by the reform. 
Robustness analyses: heterogeneous effects
Team work and part-timers
The degree to which workers socially compare themselves with colleagues in the same income tertile is likely to depend on the degree to which employees within an organization work together and have contact with each other. One can conjecture that employees in organizations that stimulate teamwork and apply fixed work hours are more likely to have contact with colleagues who are in the same age range and income tertile than those in organizations in which team work and fixed work hours are less prevalent. To test this hypothesis, we make use of answers to an employer survey that was sent to all public sector employers in 2011 (response rate was 46%). The aim of the survey was to provide an overview of the HR-policies in the different subsectors of the public sector. It contains three important questions on the degree to which employers stimulate teamwork, whether most employees work in teams within organizations, and whether employers allow older workers to work part-time. 36 We were able to match the responses to these questions on subsector level to our dataset. Table 6 shows separate regressions for workers in sectors in which employers strongly agree with the statements on stimulating team work, team work participation, and that older workers are allowed to work part-time (sector score above the median), and for workers in sectors in which employers disagree with these statements (sector score at or below the median). Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the main treatment, atmosphere and social comparison effects are highly statistically significant for employees in sectors in which team work is stimulated, while Column 2 shows that 36 Respondents of the employer survey were mostly directors, general managers, HR-managers and HR officials.
Respondents had to indicate on a five point Likert scale to which degree their organization stimulates employees to work in teams (1 means 'never' and 5 means 'always'). Furthermore, respondents had to indicate on a five point Likert scale how well the statements that most employees work in teams, and that older workers are allowed to work part-time apply to their organization (1 means 'does not apply at all' and 5 means 'applies perfectly').
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there is a significant main treatment effect for those in sectors in which team work is not stimulated, but no significant atmosphere and social comparison effects. This finding corroborates our expectations that the degree to which workers will socially compare themselves with colleagues in the same income tertile depends on the degree to which employees within an organization work together.
Although the differences in effects are insignificant, Column 3-6 further suggest that the main treatment, atmosphere and social comparison effects are greater for employees who are more likely to work in teams and are not allowed to work part-time.
The role of information
Although a campaign was launched by the public sector's pension fund in the second half of 2005 to explain the implications of the new pension system for the pension rights of each individual, it remains conceivable that worker responses will depend on the capability of the treated workers to properly assess the consequences of the new pension system for their own pension rights, and the extent to which they are interested in their future pension income. We can assume that the job satisfaction of treated workers who have a good overview on the retrenchments of their pension rights and who have looked for information on their pension income is especially affected. Table 7 shows the results of separate regression analyses for workers who do have a good or bad overview (selfassessed) of their own pension, and for those who have looked intensively at their pension in the past year, and for those who did not. 37 The results confirm our hypothesis in the sense that the main treatment, atmosphere and social comparison effects are more significant for workers who indicate that they are better capable to assess their pension rights, and who are more interested in their pension.
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Alternative sources of pension income
One would further expect workers with alternative sources of pension income to be less affected by the policy reform since the pension they build at the public sector's pension fund comprises a smaller share of their total pension benefits. One of the major alternative private sources of pension income in the Netherlands on which information is available in our dataset is the surplus value that individuals have on their houses. Similarly, one would expect that the treatment effect on the well-being of the 37 Workers were asked to indicate whether they have a good overview of their pension rights (yes / no), and were asked to indicate on a scale from 0 (not looked at all) to 10 (looked very intensive) how intensively they have looked at their pension in the past year. We identify workers who answered 6 or more (median) as those who looked intensively, and workers who have a score below the median as those who did not look intensively. 38 An exception is the more significant atmosphere effect for those who have not intensively looked at their pension.
23 men in our sample varies with the expected pension income of their partners. The financial impact of the reform is greater for workers whose partner will not contribute to the household income after retirement. 39 This may reinforce feelings of being treated unfairly. Table 8 shows the results of separate analyses for men who have a below or above-median surplus value on their house, and for men whose partners do not have an own pension income versus men whose partner have an own pension income. We find that the estimation results are in line with our expectations. The job satisfaction of workers who have a below-median surplus value on their house are more significantly affected by the reform than those with a surplus value above the median.
The social comparison and atmosphere effects are statistically significant for the first group, while there is no significant effect for the latter group. We find similar effects in the analyses for the men whose partners do not have an own pension income versus those whose partner have an own pension income.
Window changes
Although the previous analyses control for birth date, we should further examine the robustness of our results by conducting additional regressions on subsamples for a smaller age window around the treatment threshold. It is conceivable that the degree of social comparisons varies with the number of months workers were born before or after the threshold. More specifically, we expect that the introduction of a smaller age window will increase the likelihood that workers in the treatment and control groups compare themselves with each other. Moreover, individuals who just missed the old generous pension system by a few days or months may perceive the shock in their pension rights due to the arbitrary treatment threshold as particularly unfair. The results are presented in Table 9 , which shows regressions on samples of workers born twelve, nine, and six months around the treatment threshold.
40 Table 9 shows a robust pattern in the size of the coefficients across the different age windows.
For job satisfaction, the coefficient of the treatment dummy tends to increase when we select workers born closer to the treatment threshold. 41 Furthermore, the atmosphere and social comparison effects 39 A recent and growing body of literature emphasizes the incidence of joint retirement among dual-career families and the increasing importance of spillover effects between the financial incentives of men and their spouses. Among others, Blau (1997 ), Baker (2002 ), and Coile (2004 , find strong financial spillovers that affect individual retirement behavior. 40 It is not possible to introduce a smaller window around the treatment threshold, since the number of treated workers with whom workers can compare themselves becomes too small. 41 In combination with the pattern of job satisfaction as a function of birth date in Figure A2 , this may suggest a relief effect for those born just before the threshold date (October -December 1949), but the differences in the patterns are not 24 seem to increase when we exclude those who were born further away from the treatment threshold.
Although the differences in the coefficients between the windows are not significant, these results seem to buttress our previous findings by suggesting that especially treated workers who were born within nine months after the treatment threshold contaminate the atmosphere within their organization, and due to social comparison suffer less in their job (abstracting from the higher negative atmosphere effect) when they have more colleagues who were born just after the threshold, and hence suffer from the treatment as well.
Conclusion
This study used an exogenous shock in pension rights of Dutch public-sector workers to determine the extent to which a drop in the generosity of the pension system affects the well-being of workers nearing retirement. Prior to 2006, public sector workers in the Netherlands could retire at age 62 years and three months with a replacement rate of 70% of their average yearly earnings since 2002. As of 2006, those born before January 1, 1950, can continue to retire under the old rules, but for those born on or after January 1, 1950, the replacement rate has been lowered to 64%. These younger workers need to work an additional one year and one month to obtain the 70% replacement rate enjoyed by their counterparts who may be just a few days, weeks, or months older. We matched panel survey data that contain various indicators of well-being with administrative data of the public sector's pension fund, and estimated the individual well-being scores of male workers born in 1949 or 1950 two and three years after the shock in the pension system.
The results provide strong evidence that the shock in the pension system has a substantial and persistent effect on job satisfaction. The drop in job satisfaction is strongly affected by social comparisons with colleagues. Treated workers suffer less from the reform when the treatment group is larger in their organization. We also found that workers compared their own replacement rate with the average replacement of comparable colleagues in their organization, but the major part of the social comparison effect is non-monetary. Additionally, our estimates indicate a negative external effect of the percentage of treated employees on the job satisfaction of the workers in the organization, which is interpreted as an atmosphere effect. As expected, the social comparison effect is more significant for workers who work in sectors in which teamwork and full-time work hours are more prevalent, and significant. We checked that particularly those who just qualified (i.e., those born in October -December 1949) have a higher satisfaction level by performing analyses on those born in 1949 which include a dummy for whether one is born in the last three months of 1949 (results available on request). We find that the coefficient of this dummy is small and insignificant in our estimations for job satisfaction. Hence there is no convincing evidence for a relief effect.
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for those who are better informed about their pension rights. Moreover, the social comparison effect is less significant for workers who have alternative sources of pension income or a partner who have a pension income of their own. To our knowledge, this is the first study to document these strong and persistent social comparison effects on individual well-being of altered expectations about future pension income caused by an exogenous shock in a retirement system.
The main advantage of this study is that, unlike previous studies that investigated the relevance of social comparisons for job satisfaction, we exploited unique data on a natural experiment that enabled us to use reference groups exogenously generated by the experiment. The limited age difference between the treatment and control groups in our sample and the simple and transparent birth year criterion determining entitlement to the old or new pension rights ensured that the reference group does not have significantly different characteristics. Furthermore, the experimental character of our study allowed us to shed more light on a causal relation between an exogenous change in retirement expectations and job satisfaction.
This study focused on public-sector employees for whom the pension change was more profound than for employees in the private sector of the economy. One can question whether the focus on the public sector restricts the generalizability of our results. Although caution is necessary when generalizing the results, our findings have great relevance for public policy. It should first be noted that the public sector in most European countries is the largest national employer (Pilichowski and Turkisch, 2008) . Moreover, most industrialized countries are currently revising their pension systems to extend working life to cope with population aging. These reforms are not restricted to national retirement plans but do also apply to the retirement schemes of public sector workers (see Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006 , for an overview of recent reforms of public sector pension plans in European countries). Since, the main objective of social policy is to promote the well-being of the population as a whole, policy makers should consider the negative side effects of the revisions in their pension systems and try to avoid social comparisons. Moreover, recent studies by Jones et al. (2008) and Clark et al. (2009) show that well-being is an important determinant of workplace performance and individual productivity. Therefore, it is important that the negative social comparison effects on job satisfaction found in this study are taken into account when modeling the effects of a decrease in the generosity of pensions on productive labor supply. This figure presents a local polynomial smooth of job satisfaction on birth date, using a Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth for the kernel function is obtained using the ROT method of bandwidth selection. The ROT bandwidth is the plug-in estimator of the asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth which minimizes the conditional weighted mean integrated squared error. This figure presents a local polynomial smooth of the expected retirement benefit at age 62 in percentage of average wage income on birth date, using a Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth for the kernel function is obtained using the ROT method of bandwidth selection. The information used is based on the following survey question asked in 2009: 'Suppose you would retire at the age of 62. How large would your pension benefit be (in percentage of your net wage income)?' The vertical line in the figure marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 6,993 *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. All estimations include educational levels and sub-sector fixed effects as additional control variables. Birth date is expressed in days, normalized to 0 at December 31, 1949, and divided by 365. 6,814 *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. Other control variables included are educational level and sub-sector fixed effects. Column 4 includes Mundlak terms for all time-variant control variables. *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations control for the same set of control variables as in Column 3 of Table 3 . *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations control for the same set of control variables as in Column 3 of Table 3 . *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations control for the same set of control variables as in Column 3 of Table 3 . *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations control for the same set of control variables as in Column 3 of Table 3 . *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations control for the same set of control variables as in Column 3 of Table 3 . . For the estimates in Column (4) of Table 5 for the estimate in Column (4) of 
